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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for two counts of robbery in violation of 
LC. 5 18-6501. Clerk's Record (CR) 276,296. 
B. Procedural History 
A grand jury indictment was filed on January 2,2007, charging Appellant Faron Hawkins 
with two counts of robbery. CR 33. 
Shortly thereafter, on February 9,2007, Mr. Hawkins' motion to proceedpro se was 
granted and the public defender was ordered to act as stand-by coul~sel. CR 45. 
Mr. Hawkins then filed several pre-trial motions. While the trial date was reset several times, 
none of Mr. Hawltins' other motions were granted. See CR 49,51,52,53, 54,55,57, 58, 59,60, 
64,67,68,69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 87, 88, 90, 91,92,94,96. Then on September 17,2007, 
Mr. Hawkins filed a motion for the reappointment of counsel, which was granted. CR 97. 
However, on October 26,2007, Mr. Hawkins filed a new motion to proceedpro se. CR 
101. And, that motion was granted on November 2,2007. CR 103. 
Again, Mr. Hawkins continued filing pre-trial motions. And, again, none of these 
motions were granted. See CR 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 119, 122, 124, 129, 136,137, 138, 142, 
143, 144, 151, 152. 
The jury trial began on January 7,2008. CR 145. And, at the close of the court's day on 
January 9,2008, the state filed its motion in limine to permit the use of impeachment and 404(b) 
evidence and memorandum in support. CR 163 
Mr. Hawlcins repeatedly objected to this motion. C R  175. Tr. 724-5, 756-65. At Ihe 
close of Mr. Hawkins' direct testimony, the state reargued its ICR 404(b) motion stating that Mr. 
Hawlcins had, through his testimony, fully opened up inquiry into and evidence of all the prior 
bad acts outlined in its motion. Tr. 869-873. And, after listening to argument from Mr. 
Hawlcins, the court ruled that almost all of the prior bad acts evidence was admissible. Tr. 884. 
At the close of trial, Mr. Hawkins was convicted. C R  197. 
After the verdict was read, Mr. Hawkins moved for the reappointment of counsel. CR 
192. But, just moments later, Mr. Hawkins requestedpro se status again. However, the Court 
did not grant this request and instead ordered a psychiatric evaluation prior to sentencing 
pursuant to I.C. 3 19-2522. C R  193. 
That same day, Mr. Hawkins filed apro se motion for permission to address the jury to 
tell them that his wife did not do the things the state accused her of doing and a motion to 
dismiss based up011 his mental incapacity as demonstrated by the evidence fionx trial. CR 194, 
195. Neither of those motions was granted. However the Court did rescind its prior order 
requiring law library access for Mr. Hawkins. CR 196. In denying the motion to dismiss, the 
court noted both that it had ordered an evaluation under I.C. 5 19-2522 to be completed prior to 
sentencing, but that it had not received any requests under I.C. § 18-210 or 318-21 1, and that the 
court had never had any reason to believe that Mr. Hawkins had a mental disease or defect that 
caused him to lack the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own 
defense. Tr. 1120. 
Despite the denial of Mr. Hawkins' motion to proceed pro se, he continued to file several 
post-trial motions. CR 200. Mr. Hawlcins also filed another nlotion to be allowed to proceed 
pro se, CR 207, followed by several other post-trial motions. CR 209,210,211,214. 
The state filed a response to the pro se post-trial motions. CR 125. 
Again, on February 20, 2008, Mr. Hawkins filed further post-trial pro se motions. CR 
243,245-6. More pro se motions were filed on February 22,2008. CR 247,248. He also, at 
that time, renewed his request to proceed pro se. CR 249. He reiterated his reqi~est in a March 1, 
2008, motion. CR 251. 
When these motions all came up for hearing, the public defender infbrmed the Court and 
Mr. Hawkins, on the record, that he would not argue any of Mr. Hawkins' post-trial motions 
because he believed them to be without merit. In response, the Court allowed Mr. Hawkins to 
again proceedpro se and argue his motions. CR 254. The Court then denied all of his motions. 
CR255,256,257,258,259,260,262. 
In April 2008, Mr. Hawlins filed a variety of otherpvo se motions which were denied. 
CR 264-9 
On April 23,2008, the public defender represented Mr. Hawkins at a sentencing hearing. 
At the end of the hearing, Mr. Hawltins was sentenced to two life terms with a minimum period 
of confiilement of 30 years, to run concurrently. CR 276. 
Mr. Hawkins filed two other post-trial motions. CR 280,281. And, on May 12,2008, a 
notice of appeal was filed. CR 286. 
C. Statement of Facts 
111 its case in chief, the state presented evidence that on December 15,2005, Mr. Hawkins 
telephoned retired FBI agent George Calley. Mr. Hawkins, who was familiar to Mr. Calley, told 
Mr. Calley that his sons were iri  custody in Colorado for bank robbery and expressed concerns 
about their safety. Mr. Calley told Mr. Hawltins that he could not protect the boys but that he 
could put Mr. Hawkins in contact with a current agent of the FBI in Boise. Mr. Hawkins said he 
wanted to work with the FBI and also that he had been working with an Assistant United States 
Attorney in Portland, Oregon. Tr. 521-529. 
The next day, Mr. Calley heard about the robbery of a Boise bank and decided to let local 
authorities know about his discussion with Mr. Hawkins. On December 19,2005, Mr. Hawkins 
left a message for Mr. Calley to the effect that since he had not heard from Mr. Calley, he had to 
assume that Mr. Calley could not help him. Mr. Calley tried to call and email Mr. Hawkins back, 
but his efforts were unsuccessful. Tr. 530-533. 
Mr. Hawkins called Mr. Calley next on June 16,2006. In that call, he said that he had 
just robbed a bank and had used both his name and Mr. Calley's. Mr. Calley told Mr. Hawkins 
that he wanted to help him by finding him an attorney. But, Mr. Hawlcins did not respond to this 
offer. Tr. 533-535. 
About two months later, around 6:30 p.m., on August 10,2006, Mr. Hawkills called Mr. 
Calley again. This time Mr. Hawkins said that he was surrounded by the police. Mr. Calley 
confirmed through independent sources that the Oregon State Police did in fact have Mr. 
Hawkins surrounded in a trailer in a state park near The Dalles, Oregon. Mr. Calley spoke often 
with both Mr. Hawkins and law enforcement officials throughout that night, at one time begging 
Mr. Hawkins not to shoot into a propane tank. Finally, the next morning, Mr. Hawkins was 
taken into custody. A day or two later, Mr. Calley drove over to see him in the local jail. 
However, the jail would not let Mr. Calley in. Nonetheless, on August 3 1, 2006, Mr. Calley, 
along with law enforcement personnel, was able to meet with Mr. Hawkins who had been 
transferred to local custody. Tr. 535-541. 
On cross examination, Mr. Calley testified that when Mr. Hawlcins called from the state 
park, he had his wife and three children with him and was extremely concerned about the safety 
of his family. Tr. 548-550. 
The state next presented the testimony of Ja'mie Spellman, a Key Bank employee, who 
described a robbery on December 16, 2005, at about 5:30 p.m. at the Overland branch in Boise. 
Ms. Spellman said that she was handed a note demanding $15,000 and threatening to shoot her. 
She testified that she gave the robber the money and he left the bank without further incident. 
The robbery was colnpletely recorded by bank security cameras and police arrived very soon 
after the robber left. Tr. 553-65,568. 
Ms. Spellman identified several items from the robbery including clothing and the 
checkhoolc cover that contained the demand note. She also identified Mr. Hawkins as the robber, 
both in a photo lineup after the robbery and at trial. She said that during the robbery, Mr. 
Hawkins appeared to be calm and sure of himself. Tr. 572, 575-79. 
The state next presented the testimony of Kryslal Ann Smith and Alexandra Canavan who 
worked at the Washington Mutual Bank on Federal Way in Boise. The women described a 
similar robbery that occurred in their bank on June 6,2006. Ms. Smith identified Mr. Hawkins 
as the robber in court; however, she had identified a different person as the robber in a photo 
lineup shortly after the event, Ms. Canavan was unable to identify Mr. Hawkins. According to 
both women, the robber was very calm throughout the robbery. Tr. 587,590-93,601-625,630- 
643. 
The primary difference between the robberies was that as the robber lefi the Washington 
Mutual Bank, he said something to the effect that he was Faron Hawkins and he had done this 
robbery for or because of George Calley or Callahan. Tr. 609,642-43. 
The state also presented the testimony of Lori Rosenbraugh, a detective with the Oregon 
State Police who had been called to the state park when Mr. Hawkins was being arrested. Tr. 
666, 668 Her jobs included gathering information to share with the SWAT team and later 
executing a search warrant on a pickup, van, and trailer. The search turned up several items 
matching those described in the robberies. Tr. 671-4,680-81. 
Detective Rosenbraugh also interviewed Mr. Hawkins shortly after his arrest and he told 
her that he had had the pickup for a few days. He also said that he owned the van and had been 
living in it for a couple of years but had registered it in a corporate name so that if he got stopped 
while traveling he could give any name he wanted. Tr. 677-78. 
Following Detective Rosenbraugh's testimony, the state rested and Mr. Hawkins began 
presentation of his duress defense. 
Mr. Hawlcins testified on his own behalf. In his testimony he stated that he had been 
involved with Don Simplot on issues relating to wiretapping and investigation of Simplot 
employees. Additionally, he was involved in wiretapping in relation to the CIA, Bechtel, and 
Moi-rison-Knudsen. Tr. 779-780. He was initially approached by the CIA to do this work in 
1978. Tr. 782. He did more of this work from 1992-1994. Tr. 783. 
On December 16,2005, Mr. Hawlcins was telephoned and instructed to go meet Robert 
Dugan at a place called Corpus Christi out by the Boise Stage Stop. When he got there, Dugan 
and others, including his wife and children, were present. Dugan and some others were very 
upset with Mr. Hawkins regarding the loss of a shipment he had made for them and the fact that 
they wanted him to ship something else. Dugan and the others told him that they were going to 
put a bomb vest on him and have some fun. Tr. 789-90. 
Mr. Hawkins knew that the vest was real as one had been placed on him earlier, and he 
had also seen one detonated in the past. The vest contained the explosive bentonite. Tr. 791. Mr. 
Hawkins had seen these people put a bomb vest on a man and place him in a rowboat and then 
using a proximity transmitter, kill him. Tr. 792. 
III addition to putting Mr. Hawkins in the bomb vest on December 16, the people also 
made threats towards his wife and children. Tr. 792. 
The people told Mr. Hawlcins to get into his van with his wife and children while wearing 
the vest, but he refused to do so, telling thein that they would have to blow him up before he 
would do that. Tr. 792-93. 
Mr. Hawltins' second van was also at the scene. So, he and Dugan got into the second 
van. Dugan told him that since he had failed to do what was expected of hiin and what he had 
already agreed to do, he was going to be punished. The punishment was to be that Mr. Hawkins 
would be forced to rob a bank. Tr. 793-94. 
They drove to a place on Orchard and there Dugan got out of the car after giving Mr. 
Hawlcins his instructions. Mr. Hawkins was told that if he did not complete the robbery, Dugan 
would detonate the vest and have fun with Mr. Hawkins' wife. Tr. 794. 
So, Mr. Hawkins drove to Key Bank, put on the earpiece that would allow Dugan to 
communicate with him, and robbed the bank. When the robbery was completed, Mr. Hawkins 
gave all the money to Dugan. Dugan had Mr. Hawkins drive to Blacks Creek and then removed 
the vest from him. Tr. 797. 
Prior to the robbery, Mr. Hawkins called George Calley to tell him that he needed help for 
his family. Mr. Hawkins also attempted to contact the FBI. Tr. 798. 
Mr. Hawkins then clarified that the people present in relation to the December robbery 
were Dugan, Nigel Winters (who was in charge) and Ken and Mike. Tr. 798. 
Mr. Hawlcins was again contacted by these people in June 2006. First, they tried to 
contact him by phone, but he did not answer. Then later, as he was sitting in his van in a parking 
lot, Winters and Dugan walked up to the van and told him that he needed to answer the phone. 
Tr. 799-800. 
They told Mr. Hawkins that they were going for a ride, and so they did. Winters was 
exceedingly upset because Mr. Hawkins had emailed his contact in Israel about a non-nuclear, 
nonhazardous explosive propellant shipment. Mr. Hawkins had warned the Israeli connection 
that this material was being shipped to Beinlt or Haifa in containers marked "U.S. Aid." Again, 
they went to the Corpus Christi site. Tr. 800-02. 
The threats made this time were worse than those made the previous December. Tr. 802. 
So, again the bomb vest was placed on Mr. Hawkins and he was instructed to bring back 
precisely $15,000 as an interest payment for a missile guidance chip he had lost. For his part, 
Mr. Hawltins was upset regarding shipments that were not in accord with a joint Israeli-American 
operation. Tr. 803. 
Dugan also stated that as Mr. Hawkins was not willing to help out their friends in the 
community, including the Simplots, Tertelings, Yankes, and others, he was going to have to 
malce a payment. Tr. 804. 
At that time Winters made threats to Mr. Hawkins' wife and children who were on their 
way to the Stage Stop. In addition, he threatened to shoot Mr. Hawkins in the leg. Tr. 805. 
This time Winters rode in the van with Mr. Hawlcins. When they arrived at a park, 
Winters commented that it was one of the parks of their friend Simplot. And, at. that time, he 
forced Mr. Hawkins to write a demand note for the robbery. Tr. 805-06. 
Mr. Hawkins asked Winters when this would end and Winters said that it will never be 
over. Tr. 806. 
Mr. I-Iawkins left Winters in the park and drove up past Simplot's headquarters and then 
finally to the parking lot of an apartment coinplex. From there he walked to the bank and gave 
the teller the note. He was adamant that he had to have $15,000 exactly, because that is what 
Winters ordered. Tr. 807. 
At this second robbery, Mr. Hawkins was very concerned because he had not heard back 
from George Calley, so when he left the bank, he said, "My name is Faron Hawkcins. Would you 
please call George Calley." Tr. 808. 
Mr. Ilawkins had no choice other than to rob these banks, and he believed that his, his 
wife, and his children's lives were in danger. Tr. 810. 
Mr. Hawkins' past experiences, like driving a 48-foot commercial trailer into Canada 
knowing that if he was caught with the unspecified contents, he would not be under the 
protection of the United States, and having sole responsibility for a program called the "Token 
Program" which involved shipping items between various places including forts and the like, 
taught him how to control his emotions enough to do what he had to do, like the robberies. Tr. 
811. 
Mr. Hawkins used a border crossing into Canada that the FBI wanted to know about. 
And, Mr. Hawkins was willing to share this information. The FBI was interested in the location 
because it was the number one location used by the U.S. intelligence cominunity for the 
transportation of black ops materials. Tr. 812. 
Prior to the robberies, Dugan, Winters and Mike had requested Mr. Hawkins to pick up 
items i11 trucks he and his father owned. This was done to avoid FBI detection. Tr. 813. 
In Iris work with Winters, Dugan, and Mike, he was given an actual U.S. government 
identification and entered secure places. He also saw them kill five people. Additionally, they 
hurt Mr. Hawkins, leaving him with a scar on his leg. Tr. 814-5. 
Mr. Hawkins testified that his first child was born in 1996 and at that point he decided he 
did not want to deal with these people anymore. Tr. 817. 
Winters and Dugan worked for Richard Armitage, Undersecretary of Defense.' And Mr. 
Hawkins understood them to be legitimate representatives of the government. Tr. 821-822. 
Dugan, Winters, and Arnlitage had the ability to put cesium next to or with his family, 
and in fact, threatened to do so. And, Mr. Hawkins did ship weapons-grade materials for them as 
well as waste products and ordnance. Additionally, he was in charge of their funding ops which 
transported product in 48,102 trailers across the border in Michigan. Tr. 823-24. 
Dugan, Winters, and Armitage also have power over local government. Tr. 824. 
Mr. Iiawkins loves his wife and children and did his best to protect them in the years 
prior to his arrest. Further, he did not attempt to harm any law enforcement in any way. Tr. 826. 
Although Mike told Mr. Hawkins to wear a disguise at the time of the robberies, his 
' Mr. Hawkins tried unsuccessfully to subpoena several witnesses including Mr. 
Armitage to support his duress defense. Tr. 295-303. 
10 
intent was to infonn someone that it was him and to get help from George CalIey. Mr. Hawkins 
tried to contact Mr. Calley between the robberies, but he was unsuccessful. And, there was no 
one else he could turn to, because he had burned all his bridges with the local community and the 
government by turning against these people. Dugan, Winters, and Armitage knew most of the 
prominent fmilies in Boise and had a lot of control even within the local government. Tr. 828- 
30. 
Mr. Hawkins also explained the bomb vest in more detail, the communications device he 
wore during one of the robberies so as to communicate with Winters, and how he declined to 
talte more than the $15,000 demanded by Winters or to carry a gun. Tr. 833-37. 
Then, Mr. Hawkins explained how, if he was actually to rob a bank on his own behalf, he 
would conduct the robbery. Tr. 838. He also explained how the $30,000 talcen in the two 
robberies was not an amount of money that would tempt him to risk his wife and children. Tr. 
840. 
Mr. Hawki~ls also testified to several occasions between the first and second robberies 
when Dugan and Winters made contact, had him do work, and threatened him. Tr. 905. 
Additionally, they called Mr. Hawkins on cell phones, at least one &which was being monitored 
by the FBI, the Israelis and Calley. To minimize his contact with Dngan and Winters, Mr. 
Hawkins took the batteries out of the cell phones. His final contact with Winters and Dugan was 
about seven or eight days before he was arrested in Oregon. Tr. 907-908. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Hawkins testified that in between the two robberies, Dugan 
and Winters made him go to Montana and commit a bank robbery like the ones in Boise. Tr. 
910-911. 
Also, in response to state questioning, Mr. Hawkins testified that he pushed or grabbed 
his wife Darcy to lteep her from opening the trailer door to law enforcement when they were 
approached in the Oregon state park. Mr. Hawkins also admitted that he had told Detective 
Rosenbraugh that he used matches on his wife to stop her from opening the door. Tr. 920-21. 
In response to state questioning, Mr. Hawkins also testified that he had pointed a gun in 
the direction of the first law enforcement officer who poked his head into the trailer. Tr. 921-22. 
Also, in response to questioning Mr. Hawkins explained the night long process that ended in his 
arrest, including his refusal to release his wife and children until his parents arrived from Boise to 
take the children, his firing a shot, his calling 91 1 during the night and falsely telling the operator 
that the police had shot one of his children, the ultimate use of tear gas to force Mr. Hawkins out, 
his breaking a flex-cuff during his actual arrest and his statements of how he intended to escape 
and or injure officers in a final shootout. Tr. 925-938. 
On cross-exail~ination, the state also had Mr. Hawkins testify as to how he had told 
Detective Rosenbraugh that he, Darcy and his three young children and two stepsons had been 
living in two vans for several moi~ths prior to December 2005 picking mushrooms for money. 
Tr. 939-40. The state also had Mr. Hawkins testify that he had told Agent Mace that Winters had 
forced his son Garrett to rob b a k s  and that Garrett had robbed approximately ten banks. Tr. 
948. 
Further, the state had Mr. Hawkins testify that he had not told Detective Rosenbraugh 
about the bomb vest at his initial interview with her, but that he did tell her that he had been 
forced to have a transponder put in his neck by someone and that he had cut the transponder out 
to avoid continued monitoring. Mr. Hawkins also told Detective Rosenbraugh that he had 
trained with the CIA. And, Mr. Hawkins told the detective that he was not certain of the truth of 
his memories. Tr. 951-956. 
The state also solicited testimony that Mr. Hawkins had stated that his parents are actually 
adoptive parents and that his real parents are Israeli. Tr. 958. 
0 
In his redirect, Mr. Hawkins stated that he did not turn himself into the police because he 
did not trnst them and he made the false statements about using matches on his wife in order to 
protect her froin kidnaping and robbery charges. Tr. 961-62. Also, he delayed his arrest so that 
his parents could arrive to take his children because he did not want them to go into foster care. 
Tr. 963. 
Further, he lied to the 91 1 operator about the police shooting one of his children because 
he was afraid for his children. And, he fired at the ground because he knew that it would be 
standard procedure that after the shot the police would stop to find out what had happened. Tr. 
965-66. 
Mr. Hawltins called George Calley during the time he was in the trailer surrounded by 
police because he wanted Mr. Calley to ensure that the police would not use gas because he knew 
that gas is very harmful to children. Tr. 967. 
Throughout the time in the park, Mr. Hawkins' primary concern was his children. He did 
not want to take any risk that a child would be shot. Tr. 970. 
Mr. Hawltins also explained on redirect that he helped Garrett rob banks for Winters. He 
helped by going to the robbery sites with Garrett and communicating with him while he was in 
the balk. Tr. 973. 
Mr. Hawkins pointed out that they were living in vans even though he robbed two banks 
\, 
and Garrett robbed ten because all the proceeds had to be given to Winters. Tr. 978. 
Mr. Hawkins also offered further testimony about his training with the government. And, 
he testified that the people he worked with called him David Michael Hawks and that the Israelis 
call him Abel Mott. He made the statements about his parents not being his real parents because 
everyone that worked in his group always used a name other than their birth name. Tr. 983. 
Mr. Hawkins presented the testimony of FBI special agent Scott Mace in his defense. Tr. 
999. Agent Mace testified that Mr. Hawkins had told him about Winters. Also, he testified that 
he learned that Mr. Hawkins had made calls to the Israeli Consulate. Phone records show that 
the coizsulate returned a call to him on December 15, 2005, the date of the first robbery. That call 
lasted over 10 minutes. There were also calls to George Calley and the FBI. Tr. 999-1003. 
Mr. Hawkins also told Agent Mace about the bomb vest. Tr. 1014-15. 
On cross-examination, Agent Mace testified that he found the phone number that Mr. 
Hawkins used for the Israeli Consulate on the internet. Tr. 1026-7. And, on redirect, Agent 
Mace testified to an investigative effort which showed that records indicated that Mr. I-Iawkins' 
calls to the Consulate went to an answering machine and that no one there could recall calling 
Mr. Hawkins back. Tr. 1031. 
This marked the end of the defense case. 
In rebuttal, the state recalled Detective Rosenbraugh. She testified that the first thing Mr. 
Hawkins told her shortly after his arrest was about being a CIA operative and having participated 
in transportation of weapons to Canada and involveinent in a South American operation with 
National Security Advisor Negroponte. He also immediately told her about cutting a transponder 
out of his neck. Tr. 1038. 
Mr. Hawkins also told her about registering his van in a way so as to avoid trouble if they 
were stopped for a traffic violation and discussed the types of radio frequencies used by the Boise 
police as it related to robbery work. Tr. 1039-41. 
According to the detective, Mr. Hawkins also told her that he had shot people before but 
that he did not believe he had ever killed anyone. Tr. 104 1-42. Mr. Hawkins also immediately 
stated he had committed the December robbery in Boise. Tr. 1043. 
On his second interview with the detective, just a few days later, Mr. Hawkins told her 
that he was concerned that not everything he had said was true and that a lot of his memories 
came to him at night. However, he did not say anything about being forced to commit the 
robberies by use of the bomb vest. Tr. 1045. 
Detective Rosenbraugh also testified to Mr. Hawkins' plans to escape at the time of his 
arrest and stated that one of the plans involved a shootout with the police. Tr. 1047-8. 
On cross, Detective Rosenbraugh testified that after she interviewed Mr. Hawkins, she 
had suggested that he speak with the therapist at the jail. Tr. 1053. 
The state's rebuttal case also included further testimony of Agent Mace. Agent Mace 
testified that bentonite is a clay. Tr. 1057. 
He also testified that at one point Mr. Hawkins said he wanted to recant all he had said 
earlier. And, he offered that his wife was the root of all his money trouble. According to the 
agent, Mr. Hawkins also said that Garrett spent more money that he had and that Darcy and 
Garrett had acted as accomplices in robberies. Mr. Hawkins also said than he had instructed 
Garrett how to do robberies and had at least once monitored scanners during Garrett's robbery 
Tr. 1058-60. 
According to the agent, Mr. Hawkins did not bring up the bomb vest or being forced to 
commit robbery until several months into the interview process. Further, it was not until January 
2007, that he talked about Garrett being forced to commit robberies and at that time he referred 
to a bomb collar. Tr. 1062. 
Eventually, Agent Mace quit going to talk to Mr. Hawlcins because Mr. Hawkins was not 
giving credible or useful information. It seemed like Mr. Hawkins was taking national news 
stories and calling Agent Mace claiming to have information about the situations, but it was all 
very vague and ambiguous. Tr. 1064. 
Mr. Hawkins had told Agent Mace that someone had taken him to a parking lot in Oregon 
and demonstrated the bomb vest by blowing up an ATM. I-Iowever, when Agent Mace checked 
with Oregon autllorities, the story could not be confirmed. Tr. 1065. 
At one point also, Mr. Hawkins claimed to have informatioil about the nation of Dubai's 
proposal to manage United States ports and the possibility of a nuclear device coming into the 
country on a container ship. Tr. 1067. 
Agent Mace also testified that the Department of Energy does not, to his knowledge, 
move radioactive material on unguarded trucks owned and driven by private contractors. Tr. 
1068. 
And, at one point, Mr. Hawkins claimed that Winters was buying submarines from the 
former Soviet Union. Tr. 1069. 
Agent Mace also testified that to his knowledge, the FBI does not have an intern program 
wherein 19 or 20 year olds are used to place wiretaps in coiporations. Tr. 1069. 
Finally, Agent Mace testified that to his knowledge, the Department of Defense does not 
transfer sidewinder inissiles and that sort of weapon around the couiltry on private trucks. Tr. 
1070. 
This evidence concluded the trial. 
The state presented a closillg argument that focused not only on the direct proof through 
witness testimony and other evidence that Mr. I-Iawkins robbed the banlcs but also on 
inconsistencies in Mr. Hawltins' accounts. And, in its closing, the state said that Mr. Hawkins 
had, at one point, said that Darcy had talked Garrett into doing robberies. Tr. 1094-1097. 
Hearing the state's closing upset Mr. Hawkins extremely. When the prosecutor stopped, 
Mr. Hawkins was only able to say "Darcy never did nothing -" and "She never did nothing." Tr. 
1098-1099. He was unable to make his own closillg or to respond when asked if he'd like to 
make a closing argument. Tr. 1100. 
After deliberating, the jury convicted Mr. Hawkins. Tr. 1 102. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the failure to order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing to determine 
Mr. Hawkins' competence to stand trial violate his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process as well as I.C. $5 18-210 and 18-21 l ?  U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV, Idaho Const. Art. I, 
$ 13. 
2. In the alternative, should this case be remanded for a determination of whether, given 
the Supreme Court decision in Indiana v. Edwards, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008), Mr. 
Hawkins was competent to waive his right to counsel? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Failure to Order a Psychiatric Evaluation and Conduct a Hearinn to 
Determine Mr. Hawkins' Competency to Stand Trial Violated his Constitutional 
Due Process Rights as Well as LC. 66 18-210 and 18-21 1. 
Both the state and federal constitutions, as well as I.C. $9 1,821 0 and 18-21 1, prohibit the 
trial of an individual who lacks mental competency. In this case, given the information before 
the court of Mr. Hawkins' lack of mental competency, the District Court erred in not ordering a 
psychiatric evaluation and then determining whether Mr. Hawltins was competent to stand trial. 
Because of this error, the convictions must now be reversed. 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,80 S.Ct. 788 (1960) (per curium), and Drope v. 
Missouri, 420.U.S. 162,95 S.Ct. 896 (1975), hold that the Constitution does not pennit trial of 
an individual who lacks "mental competency." Indiana v. Edwards, supra. See also State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,62,90 P.3d 278,287 (2003). Further, LC. 5 18-21 1 requires that when 
there is reason to doubt a defendant's competence to proceed as set out in $ 18-210, the court 
shall appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine the defendant 
and submit a report to the court, following which, the court must make a determination of 
competency. Moreover, the court's duty to observe the defendant's competence continues 
throughout the proceedings. State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967,969,712 P.2d 668,670 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
To be competent, the defendant must have "a rational as well as a factual understanding 
of the proceedings against him" and have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Dusly v. United States, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 
S.Ct. at 788. See also, State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62,90 P.3d at 287. 
The decision of whether reasonable grounds exist to order a psychological/psychiatric 
evaluation is left to the district court's discretion. State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 822, 992 
P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999). 011 appeal, the inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries 
of that discretion and consistently with any legal standard applicable to the specific choices 
before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
In reviewing a case to determine whether the lower court erred in not conducting 
competency proceedings, the appeal court determines "whether evidence of incompetence was 
such that a reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the 
defendant's competence." United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524 (91h Cir. 1993), citing Chavez v. 
United States, 656 F.2d 512,516 (9Ih Cir. 1981), citing Bassett v. McCavthy, 549 F.2d 616,621 
(9"' Cir.), ceut. denied, 434 U.S. 849,98 S.Ct. 158 (1977). If the judge should have had such a 
genuine doubt, due process requires the court on its own motion to inquire into the defendant's 
competence. United States v. Lewis, supra. See also, Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567,603- 
4 (9" Cir. 2004) ("A state trial judge must conduct a competency hearing, regardlessof whether 
defense counsel requests one, whenever the evidence before the judge raises a bonajde doubt 
about the defendant's competence to stand trial.") 
While each case is different and there is no set of particular facts which signal 
incon~petence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant's demeanor before the trial judge, 
irrational behavior of the defendant, and available medical evaluations of competence. Williams 
v. Woodford, 384 F.3d at 604, citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 180,95 S.Ct. 896; Amaya-Ruiz v. 
Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 489 (9Ih Cir. 1997), Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (gth Cir. 1994). 
Other cases have considered factors like a defendant's emotional outburst in court, the 
defendant's act of firing his attorneys, evidence that the defendant had not even attempted to plea 
bargain, a histo~y of chronic mental disturbances, paranoid traits, violent behavioral explosions 
and previous medical evaluations andlor diagnoses. United States v. Lewis, supra; Rhay v. 
White, 385 F.2d 883 (9"' Cir. 1967). 
In this case, the judge should have had a genuine doubt about Mr. Hawkins' competence. 
The first inklings of doubt should have been raised by Mr. Hawkins' act of giving his name along 
with George Calley's at the second robbery. The doubt should have been strengthened by the 
bizarre statements Mr. Hawkins made at his initial interview with law enforcement. His 
statements regarding the need to cut a transponder out of his neck, his claims to ties with the CIA 
made during the very first law enforcement interview raised doubts with Detective Rosenbraugh, 
who referred him to the jail's social worker. The statements should have likewise raised doubts 
with the trial judge. 
Mr. Hawkins' initial interview was followed by many others, all of which were revealed 
to the court in the discoveiy and in the trial testimony of Agent Mace. See CR 83, 84, Tr. 22, 87. 
Again, Mr. Hawkins made many bizarre statenlents which evidenced delusional thinking. 
Mr. Hawkins' behavior once proceedings in court began also should have raised a doubt 
about his conipetency. For example, on May 4,2007, Mr. Hawkins filed a motion seeking CIA 
and NSA files. CR 67. On September 6,2007, Mr. Hawkins filed a motion to vacate in which he 
asks the court to consider his medical condition citing a head injury received while in the jail and 
infonnation obtained from testing at St. Luke's and St. Al's after the injury. CR 92. In a motion 
to remove counsel filed on November 10,2007, Mr. Hawkins made reference to a gag order 
issued by an Oregon judge, a claim that would appear unusual. CR 11 1. And, then at a pre-trial 
hearing on a motion to quash subpoenas and to compel, held January 2,2008, Mr. Hawkins made 
claiins regarding his need to subpoena Joseph Terteling, William Gordon and Steve Jordan 
because they had sent Winters to threaten Mr. Hawkins and his need to subpoena Richard 
Armitage of the Department of Defense. Tr. 295-303. And, then of course, the court witnessed 
Mr. Hawkins unusual behavior and theory of the case before the ju~y.  
All of these behaviors, statements, and events raised a doubt about Mr. Hawkins' 
competency in that they raised the question of whether he had "a rational as well as a factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him" and had "sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 
at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 788. See also, State v. Lo~~elace, 140 Idaho at 62, 90 P.3d at 287. All of these 
behaviors, statements, and events pointed to the possibility of delusional thinking. 
This case is like United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872 (2nd Cir. 1988), wherein the United 
States Court of Appeals stated: 
In the instant case, we believe that there were abundant indications that Auen may 
not have been conlpetent to stand trial. During the govermnent's initial 
investigation, Auen's correspondence with Special Agent Sweeney in which he 
relayed the story concerning his cat can only be characterized as the product of a 
disturbed mind. After Auen was arrested and the government agents discovered 
his cache of semi-automatic assault weapons, he threatened the government 
attorneys. Then, when he was brought before Magistrate Conan, he set forth his 
various irrational, paranoid beliefs concerning the nature of this country's tax laws 
and that basis for the prosecution against him. Finally, when Auen appeared 
before Judge McAvoy, he continued to ramble concerning his fear of persecution - 
"psycholpoliticaI terrorism'' - and his belief that he was correct and that the 
government, the court and lawyers in general were somehow responsible for his 
unjustified incarceration. Taken together these factors lead us to conclude that 
reasonable cause existed to warrant an inquiry into Auen's competency and that 
the district court's failure to consider this issue during the pretrial and trial 
proceedings constituted an abuse of discretion. 
846 F.2d at 878. 
In this case also, Mr. Hawkins' theories, beliefs, and statements appear to be the product 
of a disturbed and disorganized mind, the mind of someone suffering from delusions. Given the 
information before the court, the court erred in not ordering an evaluation of Mr. Hawkins and 
making a competency determination. 
The question then becomes remedy. In general, retrospective competency hearings are 
disfavored. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183,95 S.Ct. 896,909 (1975). In Drope, the 
Supreme Court ordered that the judgment be reversed leaving the state free to retry Drope. In 
this case, the same remedy is appropriate. At this point, as in Drope, it is not possible to make an 
evaluation of Mr. Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried. The only remedy that will 
fulfill the state and federal constitutional due process guarantees is to reverse the judgment of 
conviction leaving the state free to retry Mr. Hawkins if he is now competent to stand trial 
B. In the Alternative. this Case Should Be Remanded for a Determination of 
Whether Mr. Hawkins was Comvetent to Waive his Coilstitutional Right to 
Counsel. 
As discussed above, the judgment of convictioil must be reversed because of the failure to 
order a psychiatric evaluation and make a competency determination. hl addition, the case must 
be remanded because no separate inquiry was made as to Mr. Hawkins' competency to waive his 
right to counsel and proceedpro se. 
Mr. Hawkins was tried in January 2008, and at that time, the question of the relationship 
between competency to stand trial and competency to represent oneself had not been addressed 
by the United States Supreme Court. And, therefore, nearly all coui$s, like the court in this case, 
did not make any inquiry into competency prior to allowing a defendant to waive the right to 
counsel. Unitedstates v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9"' Cir. 2009). 
However, in June of2008, the Supreme Court decided Indiana v. Edwards, - U.S. -, 
128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008). Edwards holds that the question of mental competency to be hied is 
different from the question of mental competency to waive the right to counsel and proceedpro 
se. A higher standard applies to the latter question. The standard by which to measure the 
competency to be tried is that of having a "rational as well as factual understallding of the 
proceedings" and "sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding." Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. 788 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), as quoted in Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1066. However, the standard for measuring 
competency to waive counsel is whether the defendant is able "to carry out the basic tasks needed 
to present his own case without the help of counsel." Edwards, - U.S. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 
2386. 
In resolving the question of whether a defendant meets the competency standard for 
waiving counsel, special attention is to be paid to the question of whether "a defendant's lack of 
capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence." Id., at 2387. "Further, proceedings must 
not only be fair they must 'appear to be fair to all who observe the~n."'Id. (quoting Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)), as quoted in 
Ferguson., 560 F.3d at 1068. As quoted from an amicus brief in Edwards, "[Hlow in the world 
can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?" Edwards, - U.S. at -, 128 
S.Ct. at 2387. "No trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a man wlto is insane, unaided by 
counsel, and who by reason of his mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court." 
Id., quoting Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108,75 S.Ct. 145, 148,99 L.Ed. 135 (1954). 
While Edwards holds that a higher standard of competence is required for the waiver of 
couiisel than for standing trial with counsel, the case does not set out one specific test to be 
applied. Rather, the Supreme Court anticipates that workable measures will be devised by the 
lower courts. Edwards, - U.S. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 2388 
In this case, as in Ferguson, the request to proceedpro se was made prior to the decision 
in E d w a r d ~ . ~  Therefore, in both cases, the trial court did not make an inquiry into whether the 
defendant would be able "to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own case without the 
help of counsel." Rather, after a Faretta3 colloquy, in both cases, the trial court allowed the 
defendant to proceedpvo se, altering the status of prior counsel to that of stand-by counsel in this 
case, advisory counsel in Ferguson. Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1064. 
When faced with this situation on appeal, the Ninth Circuit devised a remedy like the 
remedy applied in another case wherein an intervening Supreme Court decision granted 
previously lacking discretion to the district court. Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070. The Court wrote: 
Were, we follow an analogous pattern [to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) and United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9Ih Cir. 
2005)(eil banc)] and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of 
determining whether Edwards would have affected the district court's decisions. 
C j  United States v. Arenburg, No. 08-CR-090A, 2008 WL 328644, * 5  (W.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 7, 2008) (considering a post-trial motion to vacate the jury's verdict and 
asking "whether a new trial is required i11 light of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Edwards"); id. ("Clearly, as a result of Edwards this [clourt had the authority to . . 
Nevertlieless, Edwards is fully applicable to this case under Gr@th v. Kentucky, 479 
U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708,716 (1987)rWe. . . hold that anew rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review[.]") 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975). 
, revolce the defendant'spro se status if the [clourt believed that the defendant's 
mental illness was so severe that he was not competent to continue representing 
himself at trial." Our decision is guided both by Ameline and by the Supreme 
Court's recognition that "the trial judge . . . will ofien prove best able to make the 
fine-tuned mental capacity decision, tailored to the individualized circumstances 
of a particular defendant." Edwards, 128 S.Ct. at 2387, 138 S.Ct. 2379. 
Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070 (footnote omitted). 
In its remand order, the Ferguson court directed the district court to reconsider whether 
its decision would have been different with the benefit of Edwards. In malcing this decision, the 
district court was allowed to, but not required to, take additional evidence or briefing regarding 
the defendant's state of mind at the relevant times. If the district court found that it would have 
altered its decision to allow the defendant to proceedpro se then the conviction was to be 
reversed and the iwatter retried with counsel. If the district court found that it would not have 
changed its decision to allow the defendant to proceed pro se, then the conviction and sentence 
should stand. 
If this Court does not reverse Mr. Rawkins' conviction because of the error in not 
ordering an evaluation and making a determination as to his competency to stand trial, Mr. 
Hawkills requests that the remedy outlined in Ferguson be adopted and that this case be 
remanded to the district court for a determination of whether, given Edwards, the decision to 
allow Mr. I-Iawkins to proceed pro se would have been different. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The convictions in this case must be reversed because the District Court erred in not 
detennining Mr. Hawlcins' competency to stand trial. In the alternative, the case must be 
remanded to the District Court for a determination of whether Mr. Hawkins was meiltally 
competent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial. 
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